

Improving Global Leadership Selection

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OVERVIEW

Ban Ki-moon's new job required him to meet no specific qualifications, sit through no formal interviews and follow no official timeline in applying for the job.

His selection as the eighth Secretary-General of the United Nations was considered the most transparent and accountable in the organization's history.

The apparent incongruity of these statements points out both the relative openness and the lack of the appropriate accountability mechanisms that characterized the 2006 selection process. The absence of formal qualifications, an official timeline or interview process in choosing the Secretary-General may provide governments flexibility in the organization's management. Yet such tools would protect both governments and the world body by ensuring the process is removed from immediate or political interests and that the candidates are vetted against formally and previously agreed upon rules.

Previous Secretaries-General often were compromise candidates chosen through protracted, politicized and largely secretive bargaining among Security Council members. The General Assembly then debated the nomination, with little prior knowledge of the nominee's background, vision or agenda, before appointing him (it's always been a 'him') to the post. In contrast, the 2006 selection process was conducted much more in the open. It was characterized by globe-trotting candidates, campaign websites and increased dialogue between the Security Council and General Assembly. Equally revealed by the openness was prolonged Security Council indecision, insufficient engagement between candidates and the broader membership, and concerns over the role of funding of campaign and aid packages.

The Security Council and General Assembly put into place increased transparency mechanisms but failed to accompany them with more fundamental elements of accountability, such as nomination deadlines, an agreed-upon role and qualifications for the post, official hearings with the broader membership and publicized criteria for candidate evaluation. Without prejudice to Secretary-General Ban, these mechanisms would have ensured greater confidence-building and satisfaction in the selection process itself. Without these elements, most of which have proven effective in the appointment of other senior intergovernmental officials, the transparency mechanisms employed in 2006 could be weakened in the future, if not discarded altogether.

Incorporating mechanisms of accountability into selection processes is both realistic and achievable, as is apparent from recent high-level appointments elsewhere in the international system. Included among these are those senior posts that are more widely known among the educated public and occupy a symbolic role in terms of global governance. The individuals in these posts oversee organizational efforts to address economic, scientific, health and development concerns that face the human family, if not always without controversy or criticism from governments or other external stakeholders, including:

- the President of the World Bank (most recently appointed in June 2005);
- the Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund (June 2004);
- the Director General of the World Trade Organization (May 2005);
- the Secretary-General of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (June 2006);
- the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (June 2005);

- the Director General of the World Health Organization (November 2006);
- the Administrator of the United Nations Development Program (August 2005); and
- the High Commissioner for Refugees (May 2005)

For many of the posts, the processes employed within the last three years are the result of difficult and protracted prior appointments. Bitter disagreement on candidate qualifications, voting rules and regional infighting marred the 1994 appointment of the Secretary-General of Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the 1999 appointment for Director General of the World Trade Organization and the 2000 appointment of the Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund. The abrasive nature of those contests provoked member governments to draft new or reformed processes that incorporated clear accountability mechanisms. The outcomes of later appointments were often accepted with greater satisfaction by member states.

Although accountability mechanisms only saw informal and unofficial expression in the 2006 selection of the UN Secretary-General, governments' satisfaction with their use in other appointments may have at least inspired greater transparency in the process:

Efforts to propose a more open and rigorous approach to the selection of the Secretary-General can draw inspiration from similarly evolving processes within the OECD and the WTO. Both organizations have established selection mechanisms that are consultative, transparent and merit-based—aimed at ensuring that the most qualified and suitable person is selected for the job. In both cases, the position is advertised, a series of consultations with member states is held, the results are made public and are then used to narrow the field of candidates...

Recently, some of the candidates participated in an event at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, which enabled them to speak publicly in front of the WEF audience about their perspectives and approaches. It would be regrettable if the WEF could organize such an event but we found ourselves unable to do the same here at the UN for the benefit of the very people who will make the selection.²

Assuming that Secretary-General Ban will serve the traditional two five-year terms, his successor will be appointed in late 2016. Prior to that, the individuals in each of the above posts will face re-appointment or step aside in favor of new office holders appointed by the organizations' members. Those who are appointed through processes that incorporate greater accountability will no doubt be contrasted with those in which such mechanisms are not utilized. If governments come away from the more accountable appointments with a high degree of confidence in the successful candidate, they will be more open to the incorporation of accountability mechanisms in the selection of Ban's successor and more broadly in other global leadership contests.

Governments, non-governmental actors and intergovernmental organizations each have a stake in ensuring qualified and accountable leadership of intergovernmental organizations. Without a

² Government of Canada. Permanent Mission to the United Nations. Canadian Non-Paper on the Process for the Selection of the Next Secretary-General. 15 February 2006.

<http://www.international.gc.ca/canada_un/ottawa/pdf/Canada_non-paper_SG_selection.pdf>

clear process and objective criteria by which to evaluate candidates, governments engage in extended and politicized debate over “qualified” candidates. The organizations themselves will subsequently under-perform in their efforts due to weak or questionable leadership, and external groups, such as human rights or development advocacy organizations, will find themselves encountering policies implemented by political appointees rather than expert office holders.

Thus it is important that these stakeholders engage in continued discussions, between appointments, related to accountability mechanisms in global leadership selection. Appointment processes for all of the posts noted above will reoccur over the next 3-5 years. Collaboration between governments, intergovernmental organizations, and civil society will better inform discussions on appropriate and tested accountability mechanisms and build confidence in intergovernmental institutions. The goals of such discussions should be three-fold: 1) to identify and promote respective and shared interests in selection process reform; 2) to build confidence in accountability mechanisms through successive leadership contests; and 3) to inform and persuade governments on the adoption of formal reforms in other processes.

In reviewing appointment processes most recently employed for the posts noted above, a number of core accountability mechanisms can be identified. Their use makes them both achievable and acceptable to governments in ensuring appointment that continue to be transparent but also incorporate greater accountability. These include:

1) An Inclusive Timeframe

The stakeholders responsible for carrying out the selection process should define and announce a timeframe for the process, lengthy enough to provide appropriate periods for the nomination of candidates, engagement by candidates with governments, intergovernmental consultations, and a reasonable transition period following the formal appointment selection;

2) Consensus on the Office’s Role

During the interim between selections, governments should attempt to reach consensus on the office-holder’s role in the international system. This role should be clearly articulated and should inform efforts to draft desired qualifications for candidates;

3) Formal Engagement Opportunities

Accountability in the selection of qualified candidates can be promoted by holding formal hearings within the organization to provide candidates with an opportunity to present their views and answer questions from the broader membership. This internal process should be complemented by rules which allow, if not encourage, candidates to engage also with external stakeholders, including relevant civil society organizations; and

4) Consensus-Facilitating Narrowing Processes

Effective governance requires broad support for office-holders earned through an open and competitive process. Identifying the candidate more capable of securing a broad if not all-inclusive consensus among governments can be achieved through a combination of facilitated consultations, straw polls and the required withdrawal of less-supported candidates.

SELECTING GLOBAL LEADERSHIP

Appointments to senior intergovernmental posts are made through a combination of different elements and procedures. This section describes, in general, elements found in most processes. Where present, the formal incorporation of these elements in the selection process is a key factor in protecting the post from politicization. The steps here mitigate states' abilities to advance differing political interests through the selection process and they support, at least theoretically, the selection of more qualified candidates. The process of selection commences with identifying initial candidates for the office and runs through an official appointment. In most cases, the process is divided into different if overlapping phases, such as defined periods for nominations, consultations among governments, narrowing the field of proposed candidates, and the final nomination and appointment. (A matrix of processes is provided in Table 3.)

Triggering the Selection Process

A selection process is generally triggered when the incumbent's departure is required by organization's rules or the incumbent otherwise announces his or her intention to step down. (All of the posts considered here are renewable, at least once, for the same or a shorter term.) In most cases, the presiding officer of the organization's executive authority announced the incumbent's imminent departure and invites member governments to put forward nominees for consideration.

Identifying Candidates

The nomination of candidates for most intergovernmental posts rests exclusively with the member governments. In most cases, governments who choose to field a candidate will nominate one of their own nationals, but different processes treat this guideline differently. The IAEA encourages member states to put forward non-nationals,³ whereas candidates for the Director General of the WTO must be nationals of the sponsoring governments.⁴ On this, the two most controversial posts, however, remain that of President of the World Bank and Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund. Based on a "gentlemen's agreement" at their establishments, the former has always been a national of the United States and the latter always a European.

Such geographic restrictions are not limited to nationals however. A common practice is the consideration of candidates according to a regional rotation scheme. In the 2006 selection of the UN Secretary-General, a majority of governments announced their intention to only support only Asian nominees.⁵ This was based on a "tradition" that calls for the selection of the Secretary-

³ International Atomic Energy Agency. Procedures for the Appointment of the Director General (Extract from Memorandum of 9 September 2004 from the IAEA Board Chairman).

<<http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/MediaAdvisory/DGProcedures.pdf>>

⁴ The WTO's procedures (WT/L/509, paragraph 8) specify that "Members shall have one month after the start of the appointment process to nominate candidates. Nominations shall be submitted by Members only, and in respect of their own nationals" and clarifies that "The term 'nationals' as referred to in these procedures shall be deemed... to refer to individuals who are entitled to the same or similar legal rights under its laws and regulations, including the right of permanent residency, as those afforded by other Members with regard to their nationals." See "Selection of the WTO Director General: Some Points to Consider. Annex 2." South Center Analytical Note. (SC/TADP/AN/IG/8). January 2005.

<http://www.southcentre.org/publications/AnalyticalNotes/GlobalEconomicGov/2005Jan_WTO_DG_Selection.pdf>

⁵ Deen, Thalif. "Africa Endorses Asia's Bid for Next UN Chief." *Inter Press Service*. 2 March 2006. Retrieved from Global Policy Forum. <<http://www.globalpolicy.org/secgen/nextsg/2006/0302africa.htm>>

General to be rotated among the several regional groups which coordinate leadership roles within the organization.⁶ The consensus was that each of the other geographic regions had respectively fielded the last several Secretaries-General and that it was now “Asia’s turn.” Similarly, there was a strongly articulated view in 2005 that the WTO’s focus on global development prescribed that the organization be headed by a national from a developing country.

Critics argue that restricting nominations to a particular region or group of countries potentially excludes highly qualified candidates from elsewhere. Proponents respond by citing the need for global institutions to reflect the geographic diversity of member governments, particularly among successive senior officials in the same post.

Nominating Candidates

The actual nomination of candidates is described in each organization’s appointment procedures. The act usually involves a letter or *démarche* forwarded via the member government’s representative to the chair of the organization’s executive body.⁷

For some posts, the nomination phase is closed with a formal deadline by which governments must put forward their nominees, with the period for nomination varying widely. Governments who wish to propose a nominee for Director-General of the WTO must submit the nomination within “one month after the start of the appointment process.”⁸ Nominees for the posts of Director-General of the World Health Organization (WHO) and Secretary-General for the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) must be received within approximately three months following the commencement of the selection process. Where deadlines are not set in advance, the executive body may announce a deadline, as occurs in the IAEA, or allow nominations to be submitted throughout the selection process. In this latter case, governments may put forward names at any point, but must consider the risks of postponing nominees until after prior entrants have locked up the necessary support to be appointed.

Deadlines serve as one accountability mechanism against a politicization of the process that would otherwise encourage “dark horse” candidacies. Such candidates are individuals whom governments may privately support from the beginning but not formally nominate until later in the process, usually after strategically voting against announced candidates. Such nominees usually unknown (as candidates) to the majority of governments, but become “compromise” candidates after others are eliminated from consideration. Deadlines for nominations prevent such surprises but may not be enough. In combination with other accountability mechanisms however, deadlines may serve to frustrate the intent of such strategic voting by a government. Formal nomination requirements will prevent a strategic nomination by governments outside of public scrutiny. Facilitated consultations, either in place of or in combination with, deadlines will serve as a more accurate method for determining governments’ true preferences.

⁶ There are five informal regional groups within the UN system: the Western European and Others Group (WEOG), with 29 member states; the Eastern European Group, with 23 member states; Latin American and Caribbean Group (GRULAC), with 33 member states; the Asian Group, with 54 member states; the African Group, with 53 member states.

⁷ In 2006, EU Parliamentarian Nirj Deva delivered what was reported to be a letter of nomination from the Foreign Minister of Fiji endorsing Mr. Deva as a nominee. Both the Fijian Ambassador to the UN and the President of the Security Council rejected the letter as improperly submitted. See Fleming, Tony. “The confusion continues...” *UNSG.org*. 8 September 2006. <<http://www.unsg.org/wordpress/archives/133>>.

⁸ See Note 12

Assessing Nominees

Once announced, the qualifications of candidates are assessed by member states. An assessment of the nominees has traditionally been conducted behind closed doors by the sponsoring governments, without notable participation by the candidates themselves.⁹ However, increasing interest in accountability and transparency among middle and smaller power governments and external stakeholder groups has forced a shift in this practice and candidates for some posts (the UN Secretary-Generalship and the WTO Director-Generalship in particular) are now encouraged to participate in promoting their qualifications for the post.

For the most part, candidates focus their efforts in private meetings with member states' representatives or foreign ministers. Additionally, candidates may meet with representatives of regional groups or intergovernmental caucuses within organizations. The candidates for the Director General of the WHO traveled to most regions of the world to campaign for the post in 2006, as did those who competed for the top post at the World Trade Organization in 2004. Though these earlier campaigns involved such travel, such trips during the 2006 Secretary-General race drew greater public attention, in part because of the symbolic role of the office and because it was the first time candidates openly campaigned for the post. In an interview, India's candidate, Shashi Tharoor, remarked that:

...this used to be a job for which people didn't have to campaign. I remember Kofi Annan when he entered the race in 1996 being able to do his work as Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping while the Security Council discussed names behind closed doors... [N]ow governments expect that if some candidates come to them, why shouldn't all candidates come to them? And so it is necessary to go out and present one's credentials to the world.¹⁰

With the emergence of public campaigns for global posts, candidates have also been encouraged to speak more openly about their agendas and views on global issues. In January 2005, candidates for the WTO senior post participated in a "public hearing" in which civil society groups were also able to post questions on key global developments issues. Likewise, candidates for the UN Secretary-Generalship individually made campaign appearances before prominent international affairs organizations and civil society groups.

The immediate consequence of these engagements has been a greater amount of information on candidates' suitability for the post. Considering that each of the appointment processes considered here strives for consensus support around a single candidate who is then nominated for appointment to the wider membership, this level of transparency improves confidence in his or her final appointment.

Narrowing the Field

Once the nomination phase is closed or the field of proposed candidates reaches a certain number, governments move to identify which if any of the nominees can attract a broad consensus among member states. These efforts are usually carried out to serve both an indicative function (suggesting the level of support each candidate attracts) and an eliminatory function

⁹ See for example Kahler, pg 57 and the quote from Shashi Tharoor at Note 75.

¹⁰ Tharoor, Shashi. Skypecast interview with Sree Sreenivasan, South Asian Journalists Association. 18 August 2006.

(encouraging if not requiring those with the least support to withdraw). Two forms are generally used: facilitated discussions among members conducted by an *ad hoc* committee or informal straw polls taken among the executive membership.

In the selection of qualified senior intergovernmental officers, the processes described above have several important advantages if applied formally. However, prior to soliciting nominations for various posts, the process would benefit from reaching consensus on the expected role to be carried out and the desired qualifications of candidates.

The Office-Holder: Role & Qualifications

For most intergovernmental organizations considered here, the explicit roles which the senior executive is expected to play are almost invariably not described in the organization's statutory documents. The official webpage for the UN Secretary-General describes his or her role as "[e]qual parts diplomat and advocate, civil servant and CEO,"¹¹ but this remains only descriptive, not prescriptive. Where an expected role is provided for a global post, it is vaguely defined as "chief administrative officer" who may or may not be responsible for the oversight of staff, chairing meetings and/or the preparation of budgets. Rarely do the descriptions convey the qualitatively more influential roles which the office holder often plays within the organization or as a global official.

The only senior post for which a substantive job description as commonly understood is defined is the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The person appointed to that post is tasked with:

...providing international protection, under the auspices of the United Nations, to refugees ... [and] seeking permanent solutions for the problem of refugees...

The office holder is further expected to

...administer any funds, public or private, which he receives for assistance to refugees, and shall distribute them among the private and, as appropriate, public agencies which he deems best qualified to administer such assistance.¹²

In a few cases, governments have compensated for the lack of explicitly defined roles through the procedural adoption of qualifications by which they are able to assess potential office-holders. Only three of the intergovernmental organizations mentioned above (see Table 1) have adopted such criteria for the evaluation of candidates.

Such qualifications have been proposed for the post of United Nations Secretary-General. In December 1945, a preparatory commission addressing how to implement the new Charter proposed a list of skills which candidates for the organization's top post should possess. Unfortunately, UN member states never adopted the commission's recommendations and they

¹¹ United Nations. Department of Public Information. "The Role of the Secretary-General." <http://www.un.org/News/ossg/sg/pages/sg_office.html> Retrieved 16 December 2006.

¹² Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Statute. 14 December 1950. <<http://www.unhcr.org/protect/PROTECTION/3b66c39e1.pdf>>

were never implemented. The Columbia University-affiliated *Security Council Report* analyzed of the commission's suggestions in light of the 2006 selection process (see Table 2), noting:

The 1945 job description in effect mandates a very wide ranging political and representational role for the Secretary-General—way beyond the narrow confines of a pure administrator. The fact that a statement of qualities and criteria was agreed in 1945 may be helpful in the present context.¹³

During the 2006 process, a coalition of civil society groups similarly advocated for qualifications (also included in Table 1), concerned that without such, the “accountability of the UN’s management and leadership framework” could be questioned. The organizations urged the UN Security Council to adopt:

...a formal set of candidate qualifications to ensure the selection of an effective and qualified candidate...to guide member states in assessing the relative competencies of the candidates and to guarantee that the selected candidate adequately fulfills the many roles and functions of the UN Secretary-General.¹⁴

The absence to date of formal qualifications or defined roles should not however be taken as an oversight on the part of governments. It must be kept in mind that in intergovernmental organizations, member states jealously guard their role in the organization’s management. Job descriptions or narrowly defined qualifications could potential limit the flexibility which governments might employ in choosing successive officials. But this flexibility can in fact weaken both the accountability of governments in nominating candidates and of the intergovernmental organizations themselves. Without standards by which to evaluate potential candidates, governments may find it tempting to offer “trade offs” among international posts during concurrent selection processes or promote candidates that favor policies preferential to their national interests.¹⁵ This is damaging to the organizations who find themselves being led by weak or unqualified chief executives and either unable to achieve their mandates or struggling against charges of bias or ineptitude.

At the United Nations, greater clarification on candidate qualification is unlikely, however, unless consensus emerges on the expected role of the Secretary-General. Since the post’s creation in 1945, the post’s occupants have served as a “diplomat, mediator and representative of the UN principles” as well as “a critical public voice on the key issues of peace and security, development, and human rights.”¹⁶ In any noteworthy sense, the post has assumed much more than a chief administrative function. Likewise, the World Bank President, Director General of the IAEA and most other senior intergovernmental executives play a much more substantial role in shaping the international agenda than is formally defined. As with the UN Secretary-Generalship, consensus on posts’ expected roles will be necessary before governments can adopt appropriate qualifications.

¹³ “Second Report...” *Security Council Report*. 21 June 2006.

¹⁴ “NGO Open Letter to the Security Council on the Selection Process for the UN Secretary-General.” *UNSGselection.org*. 17 April 2006. <http://www.unsgselection.org/files/UNSGS_SCletter_17April06.pdf>

¹⁵ Kahler, Miles. *Leadership Selection in the Major Multilaterals*. Institute for International Economics. 2001. p13.

¹⁶ “NGO Open Letter...” *UNSGselection.org*

Table 1: Qualifications for Three Senior Intergovernmental Officials

Director General, World Health Organization

Assembly Resolution EB97.R10, January 1996¹⁷

- (1) A strong technical and public health background and extensive experience in international health;
- (2) Competency in organizational management;
- (3) Proven historical evidence for public health leadership;
- (4) Sensitiveness to cultural, social and political differences;
- (5) A strong commitment to the work of WHO;
- (6) The good physical condition required of all staff members of the Organization; and
- (7) Sufficient skill in at least one of the official and working languages of the Executive Board and Health Assembly

Secretary-General, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

Common Understanding reached by Heads of Delegations, March 2005¹⁸

- Broad international experience and proven leadership ability, for example in the government, in order to provide strategic direction to the OECD and to enhance the competence and global influence of the Organisation;
- Substantive experience in the OECD's core economic areas and the ability to engage with the broad range of the Organisation's work; and a firm commitment to the OECD's core objectives;
- Proven management skills;
- Ability to represent the OECD at the highest level with governments, other stakeholders and academic institutions;
- First rate communication skills with media;
- Fluency in one of the two official languages, English or French, and the readiness to work quickly to achieve a good operational ability in the second language, if necessary.

Director General, World Trade Organization

Executive Board Resolution WT/L/509, December 2002¹⁹

“In broad terms, candidates should have extensive experience in international relations, encompassing economic, trade and/or political experience; a firm commitment to the work and objectives of the WTO; proven leadership and managerial ability; and demonstrated communications skills.”

¹⁷ World Health Organization. 119th Session. Director General: Nomination for the Post. Note by the Legal Counsel. Appendix 2. 6 September 2006. <http://www.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/EB119/B119_ID1-en.pdf>

¹⁸ Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Appointment of the Next Secretary-General: Report of the Dean to the Council. 30 November 2005. <<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/48/20/35768620.pdf>>

¹⁹ Pan American Health Organization. Working Group of the Executive Committee on Streamlining the Governance Mechanisms of PAHO. Second Meeting. Election Procedures in International Organizations. 23-24 March 2006. <<http://www.paho.org/English/GOV/ElectionPocedures-e.pdf>>

Table 2: Proposed Qualifications for UN Secretary-General

Analysis of the **December 1945 Preparatory Commission's proposed qualities** required for appointment of a Secretary-General. *Security Council Report*²⁰

- Administrative and executive qualities to integrate the activity of the whole complex of United Nations organs;
- Leadership qualities to determine the character and efficiency of the Secretariat;
- Skills to lead a team recruited from many different countries and build the necessary team spirit;
- Moral authority to model the independent role required by article 100 of the Charter;
- Ability to play a role as a mediator;
- Capacity to act as an informal adviser-or confidant-to many governments;
- The highest qualities of political judgment, tact and integrity because of the need at times "...to take decisions which may justly be called political", not only because of the political role that is expected, but also because of the power "to bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter (not merely any dispute or situation) which in his opinion may threaten international peace and security";
- Communications and representation skills to represent the UN to the public at large and secure the "active and steadfast support of the peoples of the world" without which "the United Nations cannot prosper nor its aims be realised"; and
- Overall qualities which demonstrate to the world at large that personally the candidate "embodies the principles and ideals of the Charter to which the Organisation seeks to give effect."

Proposed Formal Qualifications for the Office of Secretary-General
*UNSGselection.org*²¹

- a) Comprehensive understanding of and demonstrated commitment to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, including, but not limited to, international law and multilateralism.
- b) Comprehensive understanding of and demonstrated commitment to the three pillars of UN system: peace and security, development and human rights
- c) Extensive experience with the UN system or other complex international organizations
- d) Diplomatic skills and demonstrated vision and leadership, in accordance with the principles of independence, fairness, and impartiality
- e) Multicultural understanding and gender sensitivity
- f) Strong communication skills and fluency in at least one official UN language
- g) Proven openness to working with civil society and other relevant stakeholders

Proposed Qualifications and Criteria

*Canadian Non-Paper on the Process for the Selection of the Next Secretary-General*²²

- (i) Extensive experience in the conduct of international relations;
- (ii) Demonstrated commitment over time to the objectives and purposes of the United Nations;
- (iii) Proven leadership ability and managerial skill, including experience of modern management methods and a commitment to transparency and ethics; and
- (iv) Strong communications skills.

²⁰ "Second Report on the Appointment of the UN Secretary-General," *Security Council Report*. Special Research Report #2. 21 June 2006, <<http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/lookup.asp?c=gIKWLeMTIsG&b=1807393>>

²¹ "NGO Open Letter..." *UNSGselection.org*. 17 April 2006.

²² *Canadian Non-Paper...* 15 February 2006.

Table 3: Selection Processes of Senior Intergovernmental Officials (based on the most recent or immediately prior appointments)

	World Bank	IMF	UNDP	UNHCR	IAEA	OECD	WTO	WHO	UNSG
Formal Qualifications	Yes ²³	No	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	yes	no
Term of Office	5	5	4	5 ²⁴	4	5	4	5	5
Renewable	Yes	Yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Geographical Restrictions	traditionally always an American	traditionally always a European	none	none	none ²⁵	none	only nationals of sponsoring government	none	tradition of regional rotation
Timeframe	3 months	6 months	2 months	3 months	12 months	18 months	9 months	5-12 months	none
Narrowing Authority	internal search committee (U.S. President)	Executive Board	internal search committee (UN Secretariat)	internal search committee (UN Secretariat)	mixed <i>ad hoc</i> facilitating panel / executive board	<i>ad hoc</i> facilitating panel	<i>ad hoc</i> facilitating panel	executive board	UN Security Council
Narrowing Process	political considerations	facilitated consultations / straw polls	interview process	interview process	facilitated consultations/ straw polls	facilitated consultations	facilitated consultations	straw polls	straw polls
Narrowing Goal	American who can secure European and developing world support.	European consensus and U.S. and developing world support.	shortlist of finalists	shortlist of finalists	2/3 majority support	consensus reflecting broad support	consensus reflecting broad support	consensus	consensus (including permanent member consent)
Promotion / Outreach	political pressure	inter-governmental negotiation	-	-	inter-governmental negotiation	inter-governmental negotiation	campaigns	campaigns	campaigns
Engagement with External Stakeholders	none	None	none	none	none	none	public hearing	-	speaking engagements, private meetings
Transition	2 months	1 ½ month	3 months	< 3 weeks	3 months	6 months	3 months	2 months	2 ½ months

²³ In September 2000, the Executive Directors of the World Bank agreed on several basic qualifications for the post. The document outlining those qualifications (Annex 1 of the Interim Report of the Bank Working Group) however is not available to the public.

²⁴ The Statutes of the Office of UNHCR provide for a statutory three-year term, but the General Assembly almost invariably extends the term an additional two years.

²⁵ While there are no restrictions on the nationality or geographic origin of candidates for the IAEA DG, the Board of Governors agreed in 1993 that the successor to Hans Blix should be a national from a developing country.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING THE GLOBAL LEADERSHIP SELECTION

Appointment processes of senior intergovernmental officials incorporate a combination of various accountability mechanisms. Among the more influential posts, the appointments of the WTO's Director General and the OECD's Secretary-General employ a broader range of more accountability mechanisms. Each provide for:

- an inclusive timeframe with stages for nomination and consultations;
- a consensus on the post's role and desired qualifications;
- an opportunity for candidates to share their views with the broader membership (if not also external stakeholders); and
- a process that facilitated reaching consensus on a broadly supported nominee.

These mechanisms, having been implemented by governments including major powers, could be readily adapted to other processes where they are presently absent. Incorporating those accountability mechanisms in other selection processes will shore up the existing transparency and increase confidence in the selections' outcomes.

Setting a Timeframe

The mechanism that could be most effortlessly adapted to the appointment process of other posts, including that of UN Secretary-Generalship, is a formal timeframe. In that race, most observers had suggested a likely timeline of events that matched the actual process. Governments put forward the strongest candidates between February and June, all of whom maintained similar levels of support throughout the process, which had all but concluded by the end of September. A formal timeframe as used in the WTO and OECD process may have encouraged other candidates for the Secretary-Generalship, but would not have impacted the consistently strong showing of those who had entered early. It could have been readily acceptable by governments as an accountability mechanism and could have been an easy victory for those promoting such formal elements in the process.

Defining the Role and Establishing Qualifications

In January 2005, OECD Director General Donald Johnston announced his intention to step down from the post the following year and encouraged member states to proceed with appointing his successor. Two months later, the OECD Heads of Delegations (HOD) had reached a "common understanding" on elements of the appointment process including the qualifications by which to evaluate nominees (see Table 1).

During the same period, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan announced "terms of reference" that should be observed by governments wishing to nominate candidates for the posts of UNDP Administrator and High Commissioner for Refugees.^{26,27} Nominees for both posts were vetted by Secretary-General's Senior Appointment Group against these announced qualifications. From a short list of qualified candidates, the Secretary-

²⁶ "Annan launches wide-ranging search for refugee chief in new transparency policy." UN News Center. 25 February 2005. <<http://www.un.org/apps/news/storyAr.asp?NewsID=13464>>

²⁷ "UN General Assembly unanimously confirms Kemal Derviş as next UNDP Administrator." Press Release, UN Development Programme. 5 May 2005. <http://europeandcis.undp.org/?menu=p_article&ArticleID=91>

General announced his nominees, who were in turn formally appointed by member states in the General Assembly.

These examples demonstrate the ability of governments to agree to pre-defined qualifications within weeks of an incumbent's announced departure and prior to formal nominations. Similarly, the World Health Organization, the World Bank and the World Trade Organization each evaluate nominees against criteria adopted between the most recent selections, avoiding potential politicization arising during appointment years. A similar approach could be adopted for the IMF, IAEA and in evaluating candidates for the UN Secretary-Generalship.

Within the first weeks of 2016, for example, the UN Security Council could announce the desired qualifications for nominees for Secretary-General.²⁸ (The degree of formality for such qualifications should reflect the degree of consensus among Security Council members on the officer holder's role.) The similarity of qualifications put forward by the 1945 preparatory commission, the Canadian government in its 2006 "non-paper" or the *UNSGselection.org* coalition suggests a common understanding of the necessary skills between governments, civil society groups and the organization itself.

Similarly, European governments could reach agreement among themselves on the expected roles of the IMF Managing Director (traditionally always held by a European) and defined appropriate qualifications prior to the next selection of that office's occupant in 2008-09 (See Table 4) – less than two years away.

However, the simplest reform on qualifications that would significantly improve confidence in a global leadership selection process would require no new agreements. In September 2000, members of the World Bank's Executive Board adopted several basic qualifications desired in the Bank's President, but made the list of desired skills confidential.²⁹ Simple disclosure of the desired criteria, preferably before the 2010 selection, would notably increase accountability in an otherwise widely criticized appointment process.

Identifying Candidates

Independent search committees have been proposed as a means of identifying a wider pool of qualified candidates, actively recruiting female leaders for senior posts, and eroding the nationality principle in appointment processes.³⁰ Such laudable goals however would need to be balanced against the additional encumbrances involved in creating such committees. A joint report on appointing the World Bank President and IMF managing director recognized that creating even a small advisory group (AG) would require governments to determine:

²⁸ Though due regard should be given to input from the General Assembly, the formal adoption of such qualifications should occur within the UN Security Council, given its Charter-prescribed role in the appointment process.

²⁹ See Note 23.

³⁰ Kahler, pg.96-97.

...the composition and size of the AG, and the procedures for identifying and nomination of AG members; ... the terms of reference and modalities for the AG, including public disclosure of its members and terms of reference; ... [and ensuring that] due consideration would be given to geographic balance in the AG.³¹

Reaching consensus on these decisions would only be multiplying the inherent concerns of existing appointment processes. The responsibility of identifying qualified candidates should remain the prerogative of national governments as a means of ensuring both transparency and accountability. The advantages suggested by search committee proponents would more easily be achieved though well-defined qualifications, a phasing out of regional discrimination and formal opportunities for candidates to offer their views on issues facing the world community, as are used in the OECD, the WTO and the WHO.

Narrowing the Field

Achieving consensus on a single candidate is a widely held goal in selecting global leadership. The most common ways in which governments reach consensus are series of straw polls or facilitated discussions among members. Those processes which require or strongly encourage the withdrawal of candidates with the least support following each round usually result in consensus being reached more quickly.

The strictest process of narrowing the field of candidates occurs in the selection of the WHO's Director General. In that selection process, the Board draws up a shortlist of no more than five candidates out of the field of nominees.³² This year, thirteen nominees were put forward by member governments; eight failed to receive sufficient support to earn a position on the short-list and were eliminated from further consideration.³³

In the OECD process, rounds of facilitated discussions provided a ranking of nominees according to the depth and breadth of their support. After each round, the Chair of the OECD meets with nominees and informs them of their level of support; those with the least are encouraged to withdraw.³⁴

In contrast, the straw poll procedures used by the UN Security Council in the 2006 Secretary-General selection provided governments with a more transparent indication of the candidates' support, but failed as an eliminatory tool. The option for Security Council members to offer "no opinion" on individual candidates failed to provide a clear sense of candidates' levels of support

³¹ "Draft Joint Report..." Paragraph 9. April 25, 2001. <<http://www.imf.org/external/spring/2001/imfc/select.htm>>

³² World Health Organization. 119th Session. Director General: Nomination for the Post. Note by the Legal Counsel. Annex 2. 6 September 2006. <http://www.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/EB119/B119_ID1-en.pdf>

³³ "WHO Executive Board Shortlists Candidates For Director General." World Health Organization. 6 November 2006. <<http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/2006/pr64/en/index.html>>

³⁴ Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Appointment of Next Secretary General: Chairman's report on the first stage of consultations. 21 October 2005. <<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/2/63/35549669.pdf>>

and gave no clear signal that a particular candidate should withdraw. The rankings among those candidates considered in the straws polls never changed, yet, unlike in the WTO or OECD processes, there was no requirement that the least supported candidate withdraw in order to facilitate the building of a final consensus.

Straw polls and consultations each have their own advantages in the narrowing process. Polls provide a clear picture as to candidates' levels of support. Consultations however could encourage candidates to withdraw prior to receiving an anticipated poor showing. If combined with other accountability mechanisms, facilitated consultations can also weaken the advantages of strategic voting during straw polls by encouraging results based on the breadth and depth of support as opposed to raw numbers.

As an example, the 2016 Secretary-General selection could involve such consultations carried out by the successive presidencies of the Security Council, by the single President of the General Assembly, jointly between the two bodies or in an entirely different manner. Though the outcomes will be reported to the Security Council promptly after each round's conclusion, the content of the consultations will require the utmost confidentiality as has been the practice in other processes.

In all global leadership processes, consensus should be maintained as a preferred goal. Where consensus is not attainable, governments should accept only candidates who have achieved a minimal and previous defined level of support. In the IAEA process (which uses a combination of consultations and straw polls), if no candidate receives a minimum of two-thirds support among member states, the slate of nominees is wiped clean and governments are invited to put forward an entirely new field of nominees for consideration. This ensures a minimal level of support for the eventual office holder, which should be the goal of other appointment processes.

CONCLUSION

By setting nomination deadlines, providing opportunities for engagement between governments and candidates, and conducting a transparent consultations/straw poll process, the World Trade Organization, the World Health Organization and OECD reach consensus on a candidate for their top posts within a matter of weeks. The outcomes of these organizations' processes have generally been met with satisfaction, especially relative to those of previous contests.

In the 2005 OECD selection, the Dean of the Head of Delegations (HOD) noted that the process had been carried out in a remarkably "constructive and dignified" manner due to the commitment by governments to provide the necessary elements for an accountable and transparent process:

... the guidance and procedures HOD established in March and September 2005 for the conduct of a fair and transparent selection process stood the test and can serve as a model for future appointments. Yet procedures and guidelines are only as good as the people who apply them and in this respect, I would like once again to recognise the commitment to success and to good corporate governance which animated all of us.³⁵

As described above, deadlines and other accountability mechanisms could be incorporated by governments in other global appointment processes, increasing the likely selection of experienced and competent global leadership, and more broadly, building confidence in intergovernmental institutions. Continued discussions on the advantages of specific accountability mechanisms will be required as will advocacy by governments and other external stakeholders with vested interests in effective and accountable global leadership. Such a program for continued engagement on the issue is proposed in the next section.

Table 4: Elements of Recent Reform Proposals for the Selection of UN Secretary-General

	Present Analysis	Civil Society Proposals (UNSGselection.org)	Canadian "Non-Paper" on Selection of the UN Secretary-General	General Assembly Resolution 60/286
Ongoing Discussion on Process Reform	yes	yes	yes	--
Pro-Active Search for Candidates	no	--	yes	yes
Timeframe for Process	yes	yes	--	yes
Agreement on Role/Qualifications	yes	yes	yes	yes
Formal Engagement Opportunities	yes	yes	yes	yes
Consensus in the selection	yes	--	yes	--

³⁵ OECD. Appointment of the Next Secretary General: Report of the Dean to Council. 8 November 2005. <<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/48/20/35768620.pdf>>

A PROGRAM FOR IMPROVEMENT

The senior intergovernmental posts reviewed in this analysis are held by individuals who are nominally tasked with overseeing many of the most core aspects of life in a global community. Their selection is a matter of accountability for governments and external stakeholders that does not end with their formal appointment. As in any civic association, their performance in office, whether more economic, scientific or diplomatic in nature, depends on an accountable appointment process. Concern over the process should not arise only in “election” years, when political considerations unduly influence which accountability mechanisms are acceptable to governments.

Maintaining Interest

With the close of an appointment process, interest in its reform can wane in preference to other global concerns despite the opportunity a less politicized atmosphere provides. Future appointments, however, will benefit from continued, if less publicized, efforts to promote accountability in the selection of global officeholders. More thorough comparison of high-level processes and the incorporation of proven accountability mechanisms where they are lacking will facilitate future appointments prior to their imminent vacancy.

Continued discussions will best be advocated by non-governmental groups with a vested interest in seeing global institutions concerned with their respective programs headed by qualified persons. As shown in this analysis, appropriate accountability mechanisms exist more or less in several appointment processes and could be adapted broadly given the shared intergovernmental nature of such institutions.

Program of Action

Over the course of the next decade, each of the posts reviewed here will undertake an appointment of its senior officer (either a re-appointment of the current incumbent or approval of a successor). These turn-overs in global leadership present, individually and collectively, an opportunity for governments to test more accountable appointment processes. Other stakeholders, including external stakeholder groups, should likewise see these forthcoming appointments as opportunities to engage in partnership with governments to shape appropriate accountability mechanisms across a range of global institutions.

Efforts carried out to reform specific appointment processes independently of each other will likely result in duplication, competing programs and possible delay. In contrast, an overarching advocacy program on global leadership selection will serve to articulate a shared view on why accountability is important for specific organizations, for governments and for external stakeholders, as well as to coordinate continued discussion on reforms across successive appointments at different organizations.

Table 5: Anticipated Schedule of Upcoming Appointments

Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency	October 2008 – June 2009
Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund	November 2008 – May 2009
Director General of the World Trade Organization	January – May 2009
Administrator of the United Nations Development Program	February – May 2009
President of the World Bank	January – April 2010
High Commissioner for Refugees	February – May 2010
Secretary-General of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development	January 2010 – November 2011
Secretary-General of the United Nations	January – October 2011
Director General of the World Health Organization	May 2011 – May 2012

Program Structure

A program to select global leadership selection reform will necessitate a coordination of efforts among non-governmental organizations in regular consultation with government officials and intergovernmental organization staff. Initial research will be accomplished through an informal working group, but participating organizations should aim to quickly create a more coordinated and staffed program to undertake the necessary process comparisons and assess opportunities for action. Coordination will be carried out by a full-time program officer (supported as necessary by research fellows and/or interns) with work space provided by a host organization.

Funding for the program should be initially provided by participating organizations, but secured in the long-term through private grants and government sponsors. As grants are generally awarded for a maximum of 2-3 year periods, grant applications should provide key goals that can be accomplished with that timeframe, while suggesting goals achieved through a potential long-term (10-15 year) program. A publicized schedule of appointments will provide a roadmap for prioritizing advocacy efforts and approaching potential participating organizations. Likewise, it will impress upon funders the potential for a long-term working partnership on global leadership selection.

An “Ideal” Appointment Process

The program’s initial research will build on this present analysis to differentiate the core elements of appointment processes across a range of intergovernmental organizations and assess their respective merit as accountability mechanisms. Staff should undertake the assessment by consulting key stakeholders, including member governments, former officeholders and candidates, and other external stakeholders. Though to some degree the assessment will involve qualitative judgments, efforts should be made to reach quantitative measures (i.e. budgetary costs, political considerations) for each element’s merit in promoting accountability. Similarly, staff should identify those elements that reinforce each other as accountability mechanisms, i.e. announced deadlines and a formal nomination process.

Assessing the relative importance of various elements can suggest an “ideal” process or benchmark for identifying where accountability is deficient in existing processes. Some deficiencies, such as the lack of publicized qualifications, may be prioritized for action based on their overall importance as accountability mechanisms, whereas others, such as geographical restrictions, may not necessitate a high degree of immediate concern.

Implementing Reforms

Once stakeholders have come to agreement on a roadmap which prioritizes the offices and elements that require attention, the next phase will be to identify where advocacy efforts can be best directed. For some organizations and processes, statutory changes may be desirable in the long term, but most reforms at this time will likely only require the adoption of more transparent appointment procedures in a general meeting of the organization or an agreement of the appointing authority. For example, a decision of the World Bank’s Executive Directors may be sufficient to make public the desired qualifications sought in the institution’s President.

The research and assessment phases will have included consultations with representatives and staff at intergovernmental organizations, in permanent missions, and within member governments. Stakeholders and program staff will need to continue those close working relationships in identifying the best avenues for partnering with governments and the organization’s leadership bodies in implementing specific reform proposals.

Ongoing Efforts

A program for advocating reform in global leadership selection as described will provide the necessary coordination to maintain interest among governments for more accountable appointment processes. Over the course of the next decade, this coordination will prompt the necessary discourse to maintain the open processes used in the WTO and OECD, improve accountability in the selection of the World Bank and IMF chief executives, and formalize a more accountable process for appointing the next Secretary-General of the United Nations.

SUGGESTED AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY

This analysis of recent global selection processes and recommendations for a broad reform program is an initial step towards improving both governments' and external stakeholders' confidence in the institutions of global governance. A much more extensive report is needed for a complete picture to be made available. The following are but a few desirable areas which deserve more study along these lines:

- **Developing a more quantitative assessment of the various processes**

An analysis of global leadership selection processes is an exercise both qualitative and quantitative in nature. The limited timeframe for the completion of this survey prompted its focus on the former; a more quantitative assessment (political impact of reform, financial costs of global campaigns, etc.), will be an essential task for a complete study of the topic.

- **Governments' internal selection of nominees and evaluation of contest outcomes**

The commitment to transparency and accountability in global leadership appointments depends to a great degree on the level of governments' satisfaction with previous outcomes. Likewise, a program of reform must take into account the internal motivations of governments, particular key states, in selecting individuals for nomination.

- **The impact of shorter or longer timeframes on transparency and accountability**

The selection processes mentioned in this study were conducted within timeframes ranging from 2 to 18 months, with the longer periods complementing other elements of increased transparency. As governments prepare to fill position of significant global impact, what length of time should governments set aside for nominations, deliberations and appointments? Is there a clear correlation between the timeframe and the overall satisfaction with the eventual selection?

- **Financial constraints on global campaigns, the potential for corruption, and the desirability for global campaign rules**

If appointments to senior intergovernmental posts involved more competitive, public activity, what impact would this pose in terms of the costs to candidates, to sponsoring governments and to the international system? Should intergovernmental organizations adopt rules regarding such activities to provide a level playing field between wealthier and poorer governments? Should candidates for global posts be required to step away from existing obligations of office to avoid conflicts of interest or possible corruption?

- **The impact of blogs and other new media on transparency in global leadership selection**

Over the last five years, blogs have become increasingly influential as sources of information—positive and negative—on candidates for elected or appointed offices. To a lesser degree, they also contributed to the transparency of the WTO, WHO, World Bank and UN processes. For those following the race, blogs became the most informed sources of news and information as mainstream media often turned away from substantive international reporting. However, as the importance of transparency in global leadership selection became more apparent, the role of blogs (as well as online videos and other new media) as accountability mechanisms in their own right should be closely examined.